President Yoon Suk Yeol’s recent defense of the Dec. 3 martial law declaration has sparked considerable debate, as his remarks appear to conflict with testimonies from military commanders involved in the situation. In a public address delivered on Thursday, Yoon justified the necessity of the declaration, emphasizing that troop deployment and control measures were carried out minimally. However, these statements have been challenged by reports and testimonies that suggest otherwise, raising questions about potential miscommunication or discrepancies in the chain of command.
Conflicting Statements on National Assembly Access
During his address, Yoon stated, “We ensured that National Assembly personnel were not blocked from entering or leaving the building,” aiming to portray the measures as non-disruptive. However, this claim is contradicted by Army Special Warfare Commander Kwak Jong-keun’s testimony to the National Defense Committee earlier this week. Kwak revealed that he had received orders on Dec. 1, two days prior to the declaration, to secure the National Assembly and other key locations.
“Our mission was to secure the building entrances and maintain a state where no one could enter or leave,” Kwak testified, adding weight to claims that troop deployment was more restrictive than described. This is further corroborated by police documents submitted to the National Assembly, which disclosed that Seoul Metropolitan Police Commissioner Kim Bong-sik implemented access restrictions to the National Assembly immediately after martial law was declared.
Orders to Enforce Entry Restrictions
Despite Yoon’s assertion that “troop deployment was not intended to dissolve or paralyze the National Assembly,” Kwak’s account suggests otherwise. He testified about a second phone call with Yoon, during which the president reportedly said, “It seems the quorum has not yet been reached. Break down the door and drag out [the lawmakers] inside.” This starkly contrasts with Yoon’s public statement that normal deliberations took place within the Assembly during this time, further fueling concerns about the extent and intent of military actions.
Arrest Operations and Targeted Detentions
Yoon also defended the declaration as “an unavoidable emergency action to appeal to the people in a national crisis,” dismissing claims of excessive force by arguing, “Is there such a thing as a two-hour coup?” Yet, reports on arrest operations targeting specific individuals challenge this narrative. Kim Dae-woo, head of the Defense Counterintelligence Command’s investigation unit, testified to the National Defense Committee that he had received direct orders from Commander Yeo In-hyung regarding detention facilities and arrests.
Kim confirmed the existence of a list containing 14 individuals slated for detention and described the mobilization of investigators to execute these orders. These details raise critical questions about the broader implications of the martial law declaration and its execution.
Timeline Discrepancies in Troop Deployment
Another contentious issue concerns the timeline of troop deployment. Yoon stated in his address, “I instructed the defense minister to move troops after broadcasting the martial law declaration to inform the public.” The broadcast occurred between 10:23 and 10:28 p.m. on Dec. 3. However, Defense Intelligence Commander Moon Sang-ho’s testimony paints a different picture. Moon reported receiving orders from former Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun around 9 p.m. to position troops near the Government Complex in Gwacheon, Gyeonggi.
Further complicating the timeline, intelligence personnel were reported to have entered the National Election Commission (NEC) just five minutes after the martial law declaration broadcast concluded, at 10:33 p.m. Yoon’s justification for this deployment—“to inspect the computer systems—is also under scrutiny. Jeong Sung-woo, chief of the First Division at the Defense Counterintelligence Command, testified that orders had been issued to prepare for potential violations of the martial law declaration’s second clause, which prohibited fake news, public opinion manipulation, and false incitement.
Disputes Over Troop Numbers and Armament
The number of troops deployed and their armament during the operation has also become a point of contention. Yoon claimed that fewer than 300 unarmed troops were deployed to the National Assembly. However, the National Assembly Secretariat reported on Dec. 4 that approximately 280 troops entered the Assembly, while Democratic Party Rep. Boo Seung-chan countered that the actual number was 685.
Furthermore, Yoon’s assertion that “the martial law troops were unarmed” has been disputed. Kim Hyun-tae, commander of the 707th Special Mission Group, testified to the National Defense Committee that troops had been equipped with tasers, blank rounds, and cable ties, preparing for non-lethal force suppression operations. This testimony suggests that the deployed forces were prepared for scenarios involving active resistance, contradicting Yoon’s depiction of a minimal and non-threatening presence.
Chain of Command and Possible Miscommunication
The discrepancies between Yoon’s public statements and testimonies from military commanders raise concerns about possible miscommunication or distortion of instructions within the chain of command. Former Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun’s role has come under particular scrutiny, as some speculate that intermediaries may have altered or misunderstood the president’s directives.
For instance, Yoon stated, “I instructed the defense minister to move troops after broadcasting the martial law declaration,” but testimonies suggest that orders were issued well in advance of the broadcast. If true, this could indicate either a breakdown in communication or intentional actions by intermediaries that deviated from Yoon’s original instructions.
Broader Implications and Public Reaction
The Dec. 3 martial law declaration and its aftermath have sparked widespread debate over the balance between national security and democratic principles. Critics argue that the deployment of troops to key locations, the enforcement of access restrictions, and the targeting of individuals for detention reflect an overreach of executive power. These concerns have fueled calls for greater transparency and accountability from the administration.
Yoon’s defense of the declaration as a necessary response to a national crisis has not assuaged these concerns. Instead, the conflicting testimonies and evidence have heightened public skepticism and underscored the need for a comprehensive investigation into the events surrounding the martial law declaration.
Conclusion
The discrepancies between President Yoon Suk Yeol’s defense of the Dec. 3 martial law declaration and the testimonies of military commanders highlight significant concerns about the transparency and accountability of the operation. From conflicting accounts of troop deployment and access restrictions to disputes over the timeline and intent of military actions, these issues underscore the need for further inquiry and clarification.
As public scrutiny intensifies, it is essential for the administration to address these concerns openly and provide a full account of the events. Doing so would not only help restore public trust but also reaffirm the nation’s commitment to democratic principles and the rule of law in times of crisis.